Publikationen

Art der Publikation: Beitrag in Sammelwerk

CAn’t Touch This: Software-only Mitigation against Rowhammer Attacks targeting Kernel Memory

Autor(en):
Ferdinand Brasser; Lucas Davi; David Gens; Christopher Liebchen; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Titel des Sammelbands:
Proc. of 26th USENIX Security Symposium
Veröffentlichung:
2017
Ergänzende Unterlagen:
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Link zum Volltext:
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-brasser.pdf
Zitation:
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Kurzfassung

Rowhammer is a hardware bug that can be exploited to implement privilege escalation and remote code execution attacks. Previous proposals on rowhammer mitigations either require hardware changes or follow heuristic-based approaches (based on CPU performance counters). To date, there exists no instant protection against rowhammer attacks on legacy systems.

In this paper, we present the design and implementation of a practical and efficient software-only defense against rowhammer attacks. Our defense, called CATT, prevents the attacker from leveraging rowhammer to corrupt kernel memory from user mode. To do so, we extend the physical memory allocator of the OS to physically isolate the memory of the kernel and user space. We implemented CATT on x86 and ARM to mitigate rowhammer-based kernel exploits. Our extensive evaluation shows that our mitigation (i) can stop available real-world rowhammer attacks, (ii) imposes virtually no runtime overhead for common user and kernel benchmarks as well as commonly used applications, and (iii) does not affect the stability of the overall system.